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Competitive Nash Equilibria and Two Period Fund Separation
Abstract
We suggest a simple asset market model in which we analyze competitive and strategic behavior
simultaneously. If for competitive behavior two-fund separation holds across periods then it
also holds for strategic behavior. In this case the relative prices of the assets do not depend
on whether agents behave strategically or competitively. Those agents acting strategically will
however invest less in the common mutual fund. Constant relative risk aversion and absence
of aggregate risk are shown to be two alternative suﬃcient conditions for two-period fund
separation. With derivatives further strategic aspects arise and strategic behavior is distinct
from competitive behavior even for those utility functions leading to two-fund separation.
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1 Introduction
Standard asset pricing models, as for example the Capital Asset Pricing Model, CAPM, are based on the
assumption that all market participants take prices as given. These models give a ﬁrst intuition for the
valuation of assets when portfolio considerations and diversiﬁcation are important. Moreover, these models
are general in the sense that they can be applied to an arbitrary number of assets. They can however not
cope with important issues that practitioners face when a lack of liquidity of markets and so called ”slippage”
of asset prices are a major concern. The market impact of portfolio decisions is clearly taken into account
by institutional investors like pension funds that in most markets hold most of the assets. Also, many hedge
funds limit their assets under management because running their strategies with too much capital would
eliminate the potential gains from their strategies. Moreover, to beneﬁt from portfolio diversiﬁcation large
investors and hedge funds invest on many markets simultaneously. To cope with these issues while keeping
the beneﬁts of portfolio diversiﬁcation, models of simultaneous strategic interaction on a large number of
asset markets are needed.
The idea of this paper is to systematically compare price taking and strategic behavior for a simple asset
market with simultaneous competition on arbitrary many assets. The price of this generality is that we
limit our attention to symmetric information models with a given complete participation on asset markets.
Also in our paper initially investors are not endowed with assets so that changing the market price does
not change the wealth of the investor. These important aspects should be considered once the diﬀerence of
strategic and competitive behavior has been understood in our more simple setting.
We consider a two period model with a ﬁnite number of states in the second period. A ﬁnite number of
investors are endowed with wealth that can be spent on ﬁrst period consumption and on a ﬁnite number of
assets (bonds and shares) delivering state contingent payoﬀs in the second period. We assume that every
investor is small on the market for ﬁrst period consumption. First period consumption resembles the real
GDP of the world. On this market a large number of producers, pure consumers, and investors interact
and so we assume that even large investors are small. Warren Buﬀet and George Soros, for example, are
estimated to manage wealth of approximately a couple of billions USD. This is a huge amount as compared
to the market capitalization for individual stocks, while it can be neglected relative to the world’s GDP. As-
set markets can be complete or incomplete. In our model asset payoﬀs are the only source to ﬁnance second
period consumption. All consumers split their wealth between ﬁrst period consumption and a portfolio of
assets in order to maximize intertemporal utility. On the asset market we allow for competitively and also
for strategically acting investors. In the ﬁrst case the investors take prices as given while in the second
case they take the market impact of their demand into account. One may argue that these diﬀerent types
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of behavior can arise if estimating the market impact is costly because it requires data bases and research
facilities so that only some investors have a suﬃcient incentive to consider their market impact. How-
ever, these arguments are beyond our model. Throughout the paper we assume that investors have expected
utility functions with homogenous beliefs. As it is well known, for example from Magill and Qunizii [12],
the CAPM is the special case of our model which is obtained with only competitively acting investors and
quadratic von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. With respect to the strategic behavior the model is
similar to the famous Shapley-Shubik [17] Market Game. It will turn out that the number of assets obtained
by any investor are given by the ratio of the wealth he has ”bet” on that asset divided by the total wealth
bet on that asset. One important diﬀerence will be that in our model assets are in ﬁxed exogenous supply
and income does not depend on the market outcome. Hence in contrast to the Shapley Shubik model we
can easily ensure that the budget restrictions holds. We formulate the agents’ decisions in terms of budget
shares that are required to add up to one. This formulation of the investment problem in terms of wealth
shares, the so called ”asset allocation”, is standard in ﬁnance. It allows to discuss investment decisions
based on returns, i.e. payoﬀs per price of assets. Keeping this convention our results are more easily
comparable to the ﬁnance literature.
The point of our paper is to analyze under which conditions and in which respect strategic investment
behavior diﬀers from competitive behavior. To start with, we show that, as the number of investors becomes
large, strategic behavior tends to competitive behavior. For a general account of this so called Cournotian
foundation of competitive equilibria see Mas-Colell [14]. To obtain this result we let the economy grow
in a very symmetric way. In each step one additional identical copy, a replica, of the strategic agents is
introduced. Ever since Debreu and Scarf [6] such limit results for replica economies are well know in the
general equilibrium literature (cf. Hildenbrand and Kirman [9]). Since in our model the supply is exogenous
we increase it proportionally to the number of consumers in our economy. Besides this standard result on
the convergence of strategic and competitive behavior we give suﬃcient conditions for ﬁnite economies,
such that with respect to the asset allocation problem strategic and competitive behavior become identical.
We show that if a form of fund separation holds for competitive behavior – that we suggest to call two
period fund separation – then strategically acting agents will form the same portfolio of assets as competi-
tive agents. Both types of behavior do however diﬀer with respect to the amount of wealth invested in the
common mutual fund of assets. The strategically acting investors take into account that their demand will
let prices slip to their disadvantage and hence invest less into assets as compared to investors with identical
characteristics that behave competitively. We also give suﬃcient conditions for two period fund separation.
One such suﬃcient condition is constant relative risk aversion, CRRA. An alternative condition is the case
of no-aggregate risk, NAR.
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The asset pricing implications of two period fund separation are that the ratios of the prices of risky
assets do not depend on whether agents behave competitively or strategically. Moreover, for the case of
no-aggregate risk the weight of any asset in the mutual fund turns out to be the expected value of its payoﬀ
relative to the total payoﬀ of all assets. This coincides with so called log-optimal pricing (cf. Luenberger
[11], chapter 15). It is well known that log-optimal pricing is also obtained if all investors – acting com-
petitively – have logarithmic von-Neumann Morgenstern utilities, a special case of CRRA (cf. Kraus and
Litzenberger [10]). We show that this is still true if one allows for strategic behavior.
In the case of the CAPM heterogeneity in market behavior matters if there is aggregate risk. We observe
that strategically and competitively acting agents do choose substantially diﬀerent portfolios and hence asset
prices diﬀer substantially. On the other hand, if the market does not exhibit aggregate risk, both investors,
even if they diﬀer in their strategic behavior, choose the same portfolio. Introducing derivatives leads to
a new strategic aspect of the model. On changing demand for the underlying asset agents can change the
payoﬀs of the derivatives that are based on the prices of that underlying. Indeed in this case it turns out
that even with logarithmic utility functions equilibria depend substantially on the form of market behavior.
There is an impressive literature on strategic competition in general equilibrium models. This literature
has at least the two lines originating in Gabszewicz and Vial [8] and Shapley-Shubik [17]. For a recent
account see the recent special issue of the Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 39, Nos. 5-6, edited by
Gae¨l Giraud. Our contribution in this respect is that we highlight the importance of two-fund separation to
obtain more speciﬁc results. The cases under which we show that two-period fund separation holds, CRRA
and NAR, are clearly not general in the set of all theoretically possible economies but they are important
cases studied extensively in the ﬁnance literature. Ever since Merton [15] CRRA has become the ”work
horse” of ﬁnance. Also Campbell and Viceira [4] (page 24) argue convincingly that only the case of CRRA
is compatible with observed aggregate time series of consumption and risk premia: Wealth has grown con-
siderably while the risk premium remained quite stable over time. The second case for which we can show
two-period fund separation is the case of no aggregate risk. Ever since Borch [2] and Malinvaud [13] also
this case has been extensively studied in the literature. It is the work horse case for insurance theory.
In the ﬁnance literature market impact has been a serious concern, for example, in the ﬁeld of derivatives
(cf. Taleb [19]), when asymmetric information (cf. Brunnermeier [3]) has been considered and in models
with endogenous market participation (cf. Pagano [16]). Only the case of derivatives seems suﬃciently
similar to the model considered here. When presenting our results in section 6.1 concerning derivatives we
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will discuss the diﬀerence of this literature to our approach.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section gives the details of the model. Then we
suggest an equilibrium concept, that we call Competitive Nash Equilibrium, CNE, in which we study com-
petitive and strategic behavior simultaneously. Having made the equilibrium notion precise we demonstrate
the limit theorem. Thereafter, two-period fund separation is deﬁned and it is shown that under standard
diﬀerentiability assumptions on the utility functions CNE with two period fund separation do exist. Then
we show that CRRA and NAR are suﬃcient conditions for CNE with two period fund separation. Based
on this the pricing implications are derived. Also, when presenting the general results we give numerical
examples for the CAPM case and the log-utility case to illustrate the robustness. Finally, we consider the
case of derivatives.
2 The model
In the following we deﬁne the model we are concerned with. The deﬁnition is divided into mainly two parts,
the ﬁrst one concerns the market while the second one concerns the characteristics of the agents on the
market.
2.1 The market (q,A)
We consider a 2 periods model with periods t = 0 and t = 1 of an economy with S states s and K assets
k. Let us denote by S0 := {0} ∪ S the set of states, where for convenience s = 0 is the state at time 0, and
S := {1, .., S} is the set of states at time 1. Let k = 0 be the consumption good while K = {1, ..,K} is the
set of assets available at time 1.
Let A ∈ RK×S+ be the matrix of non-negative payoﬀs of the assets k ∈ K over states s ∈ S. We assume
that there are no redundant assets, i.e. rank A = K. Assets k ∈ K are in exogenous supply which is
normalized to 1, while the consumption good is in ∞−elastic supply. q ∈ RK+ is the price system on the
market A, while the price for the consumption good is normalized to 1.
2.2 The investor i
Let I = {1, .., I} be the set of investors on the market. It is assumed that investors have homogenous be-
lieves about states in period 1, i.e. pi = p ∈ ∆S+ is the vector of probabilities for states s ∈ S. An investor
is characterized by his ﬁrst period wealth (endowment) wi ∈ R+ and by his utility Ui on his consumption
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in periods t = 0, 1. His investment strategy is denoted by λi = λi(wi) =
(
λi0(w
i),λi1(w
i)
)
∈ RK+1+ , where
λi0(w
i) is his (budget) share of investment in the consumption good and λi1(w
i) is his investment in assets
k ∈ K on A. Let λ = (λi, i ∈ I) be the vector of investment strategies over the investor population I.
Each investor i is supposed to partition all his wealth into 0 period consumption and investment in assets
k ∈ K to obtain 1-st period consumption. Formally, his budget constraint therefore reads ∑Kk=0 λik = 1
or equivalently λi ∈ ∆K+1+ , ∀i ∈ I. Note that we exclude short sales. This exclusion is a consequence of
allowing for strategic behavior. Strategically acting agents know that they could decrease asset prices below
zero by going short in assets. As an eﬀect portfolio returns would then become positive and it would pay
even more to short the assets further. Without any short sales constraints this would result in unlimited
arbitrage opportunities, ruling out the possibility of any type of equilibria.
The consumption of investor i results from his investment strategies as follows. The consumption
function of the i-th investor is deﬁned as ci : ∆K+1+ → RS+1+ by ci(λi) :=
(
ci0(λ
i), ci1(λ
i)
)
, where ci1(λ
i) =(
cis(λ
i), s ∈ S) is the consumption of the i − th investor over states s ∈ S according to his investment
strategy λi:
ci0(λ
i) = λi0 w
i (1)
cis(λ
i) =
∑
k∈K
Aks
λikw
i
qk
s ∈ S. (2)
Recall that all assets are in unit supply. The equilibrium price system q then is given by the investment
strategies by requiring qk =
∑
i∈I λ
i
kw
i for all assets k ∈ K. Hence market clearing prices are the wealth
average of the investor‘s strategies.
Given the probabilities p, the preferences of the i-th investor are represented by an expected utility
function Ui : RS+1+ → R deﬁned by Ui(ci(λi)) = ui0(ci0(λi)) + βiU i1(ci1(λi)), where βi is a real-valued
discount factor, 0 ≤ βi ≤ 1, and ui0 : R+ → R, and U i1 : RS+ → R is deﬁned by
U i1(c
i
1(λ
i)) :=
∑
s∈S
ps u
i
1(c
i
s(λ
i)),
where ui1 : R+ → R. Note that Ui = (ui0, U i1). We arrive at
[Ui ◦ ci](λi) = Ui(ci(λi)) = ui0(ci0(λi)) + βi
∑
s∈S
psu
i
1(c
i
s(λ
i)). (3)
We make the following standard assumption about the utility function for any i ∈ I:
• uit : R+ → R, t = 0, 1, is twice continuously diﬀerentiable,
• strictly increasing, strictly concave and
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• (INADA): for any c ∈ R+, ∂∂c uit(c) →∞ as c → 0.
Recently, Alos-Ferrer and Ania [1] have studied Nash equilibria in a similar model when agents are risk
neutral. This case requires diﬀerent techniques. It turns out that all agents choosing a portfolio with weights
equal to the relative expected payoﬀs is the unique Nash equilibrium.
3 The equilibrium concept: A ﬁrst deﬁnition
In a competitive equilibrium the agents take the market’s price system q∗ as given. This situation is dif-
ferent in the Nash equilibrium where investors anticipate that trading alters prices on the market. Investor
j, thinking strategically, knows that q˜k(λ˜
i
(wi)) = λ˜ikw
i +
∑
j =i λ˜
j
kw
j, k ∈ K. Hence for a given wealth
distribution, the equilibrium price system q˜ is anticipated to depend on the set of investment strategies
λ˜, i.e. q˜ = q˜(λ˜). Consequently, any individual‘s optimal strategy λ˜
i
depends directly on the strategies
of all other traders i′ ∈ I(−i). On a market both types of investors, i.e. those following the competitive
equilibrium concept and those following the Nash equilibrium concept, coexist.
The consumption of a competitively behaving investor on A therefore is
ci(λi; q) =

λi0wi,
(∑
k∈K
Aks
λikw
i
qk
)
s∈S

 , q given, i ∈ IC ,
while the consumption of a strategically behaving investor i on A relative to investors {j = i} yields
ci(λi;λ(−i)) =

λi0wi,
(∑
k∈K
Aks
λikw
i
λikw
i +
∑
j =i λ
j
kw
j
)
s∈S

 , λ(−i) = (λjk)j =i given i ∈ IN
Note that we have partitioned the set of investors I into the set of those following the competitive strategy
IC and those following the Nash strategy, IN , i.e. I = IC ∪ IN .
Now we are in a position to deﬁne Competitive Nash Equilibria:
Deﬁnition 1 (Competitive Nash Equilibrium (CNE)) Given an economy with wealth distribution w ∈
R
I
++, a Competitive Nash Equilibrium is a pair (qˆ, λˆ), λˆ = (λˆ
i, i ∈ I), such that for all investors i ∈ IC∪IN
the following conditions are fulﬁlled simultaneously
• λˆi ∈ argmax
λi∈∆K+1+
[
U
i ◦ ci
]
(λi) (4)
• qˆk =
∑
i∈I
λˆikw
i, k ∈ K, (5)
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where the consumption of a competitively behaving investor is
ci(λi; qˆ) =

λi0wi,
(∑
k∈K
Aks
λikw
i
qˆk
)
s∈S

 , qˆ given, i ∈ IC ,
while the consumption of a strategically behaving investor i relative to investors {j = i} is
ci(λi; λˆ
(−i)
) =

λi0wi,
(∑
k∈K
Aks
λikw
i
λikw
i +
∑
j =i λˆ
j
kw
j
)
s∈S

 , (λˆ)j =i given i ∈ IN
3.1 The FOCs and State price Vectors in CE and NE
In the following we will show that under the conditions made for the utility function the First Order
Condition (FOC) is suﬃcient for determining the optimum. Let us therefore ﬁrst derive the First Order
Condition for CNE.
Lemma 1 Consider i ∈ I with wealth wi ∈ R+. Deﬁning the scaled nabla operator ∇¯i = (∇¯is)s∈S, where
∇¯is := βi
(
∂ui0(c
i
0)
∂ci0
)−1
· ∂
∂cis
, the ﬁrst order condition for the optimization problem for a CNE (q,λ), λ = (λi)
reads
q = A ∇¯iU i1
(
ci1(λ
i)
)
• N i(λ), (6)
where • denotes the componentwise multiplication of two vectors. N i(λ) has components
N ik(λ) =


1 i ∈ IC
1− λikwi∑
j λ
j
k
wj
i ∈ IN
(7)
Furthermore, the First Order Condition is necessary and also suﬃcient for determining the maximum.
Proof 1 The agent’s optimization problem reads max[Ui ◦ ci](λi) subject to the conditions ∑Kk=0 λik = 1
and λik ≥ 0. Deﬁning g(λi) :=
∑K
k′=0 λ
i
k′ , the ﬁrst order conditions (FOCs) are
∂
∂λi
k
[
U
i ◦ ci
]
(λi) ≤ α ∂
∂λi
k
g(λi) +
K∑
k=0
α′k, R  α, α′k ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K
Because of the INADA assumption about the utility function Ui, we can exclude the cases {α = 0}∨{α′k =
0}k=0..K and hence all solutions are interior. Since Ui is assumed to be increasing, the FOCs hold with
equality and we obtain
wi = βi
∑
s
ps
∂
∂cis
ui1(c
i
s(λ
i))
∂
∂ci0
ui0(c
i
0(λ
i))
(
∂cis(λ
i)
∂λik
)
. (8)
Denoting by ∇¯is the operator for the scaled partial derivative
∇¯is := βi
(
∂ui0(c
i
0)
∂ci0
)−1
· ∂
∂cis
,
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the FOC for the k-th component in K becomes
wi =
∑
s
∇¯is U i1
(
ci1(λ
i)
) (∂cis(λi)
∂λik
)
.
A straightforward calculation yields
∂cis(λ
i)
∂λik
= wi
∑
k′
Ak
′
s
(
∂λik′
∂λik
1
qk′
− λ
i
k′
(qk′)2
∂qk′
∂λik
)
=
wiAks
qk
(
1− λ
i
kw
i∑
j λ
j
kw
j
δi
)
,
where δi = 1 if i ∈ IN and 0 if i ∈ IC . Thus, by deﬁning the so called Nash term
N ik(λ) = 1− λ
i
kw
i∑
j λ
j
kw
j
δi. k ∈ K (9)
the First Order Condition takes the form
qk =
(∑
s
Aks ∇¯isU i1
(
ci1(λ
i)
))
N ik(λ) (10)
q = A ∇¯i U i1
(
ci1(λ
i)
)
• N i(λ) i ∈ I, (11)
where ∇¯i is the vector of the scaled partial derivatives ∇¯is deﬁned above and • denotes the componentwise
multiplication of two vectors.
Note that FOC for CE and NE only diﬀer by a factor N i(λ). Moreover, note that for δ = 1 we get
N ik(λ) =
∑
j =i λ
j
kw
j∑
j λ
j
kw
j
. (12)
It remains to be shown that this condition is suﬃcient for determining the maximum. This follows from
above because cis is concave in each component s since
[
∂2cis
∂λik∂λ
i
k′
]
=


−Akswi
q2
k
δi ≤ 0 k = k′
0 k = k′
Hence, as a composition of concave functions, [Ui ◦ ci] is componentwise concave and so the FOC is
necessary and also suﬃcient for determining the maximum.
In the case of a population with homogenous behavior this reduces to the standard deﬁnitions.
Corollary 1 (Competitive equilibrium) Consider a 2 period economy with I investors I = IC and wealth
w ∈ RI+, where investor i has an utility function Ui = (ui0, U i1) : RS+1+ → R as deﬁned above. Then a
competitive equilibrium is a tuple (q∗,λ∗), λ∗ = (λ∗i, i ∈ I), where q∗ ∈ RK+ and λ∗i ∈ ∆K+1+ such that
q∗ = A ∇¯iU i1(ci1(λ∗i)) ∀i ∈ IC where (13)
cis(λ
∗i) =
∑
k∈K
Aks
λ∗ik w
i∑
j∈I λ
∗j
k w
j
(14)
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Corollary 2 (Nash equilibrium) Consider a 2 period economy with I investors I = IN and wealth w ∈
R
I
+, where investor i has an utility function U
i = (ui0, U
i
1) := R
S+1
+ → R with components ui1 as deﬁned
above. Then a Nash equilibrium is a pair (q˜, λ˜), λ˜ = (λ˜
i
, i ∈ I), where q˜ ∈ R+ and λ˜i ∈ ∆K+1+ such that
q˜ = A ∇¯iU i1(ci1(λ˜i)) • N i(λ˜) ∀i ∈ IN where (15)
cis(λ˜
i) =
∑
k∈K
Aks
λ˜ikw
i∑
j∈I λ˜
j
kw
j
(16)
4 A Limit Theorem
While in general CE and NE diﬀer for small economies, both coincide in the limit of a large economy.
Let us consider a market on which a N-multiplicity of investors act, i.e. we have N · I agents. Each
agent i is supposed to have N identical replica i(1), .., i(N) having identical utility functions Ui,n = Ui
and income distribution wi,n = wi following the strategies λi,n. We assume that supply or equivalently
payoﬀs are scaled appropriately, i.e. A(N) =
(
fk(N)A
k
s
)
k∈K,s∈S
, where fk(N) ≥ 0 for all k ∈ K. Then
for strategically acting agents N i,(N)k (λ) := 1 − λ
i
kw
i
N
∑I
j=1 λ
j
k
wj
for k ∈ K. The following statement follows
immediately from Theorem 1.
Corollary 3 Let λ˜
i,n ∈ ∆K+1+ , i = 1..I, n = 1..N be a Nash optimal investment strategy for the i − th
investor in a N fold replica economy as deﬁned above. Then λ˜
(i,n) → λ∗,i as N → ∞ provided that
fk(N)
N
→ 1 for all k, where λ∗i is the optimal competitive strategy of investor i in the one fold replica,
N = 1.
Proof 2 According to equation 11 the FOC for the N replica NE economy is as follows
q˜ = A(N)∇¯iU i1(ci1(λ˜i) • N i,(N)(λ˜),
where q˜k =
∑I,N
i,n=1 λ˜
i,n
k w
i,n = N
∑I
i=1 λ˜
i
kw
i such that we have
N
I∑
i=1
λikw
i =
(∑
s
Aks ∇¯isU i1(ci1(λ˜i)
)
fk(N)N i,(N)k (λ˜)
Finally observe that N i,(N)k (λ˜) → 1 as N → ∞. Hence if N → ∞ and fk(N)/N → 1 the expression
reduces to the FOC of CE. Therefore, under these conditions q˜k
q∗
k
→ 1 and hence the claim follows.
5 Two-Period Fund Separation
In this section we demonstrate that increasing the size of the economy is not the only case in which
competitive and strategic behavior become similar. Actually for any ﬁnite economy it is shown that for this
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to hold a form of two-fund separation is decisive. Recall that similar forms of two fund separation are
known to be the basis for many important results in ﬁnance, as for examples the CAPM. We will discuss
the distinction between the two fund separation for our paper and that of CAPM once we have deﬁned our
notion. The investment strategy of investor i is λi ∈ ∆K+1+ ⊂ RK . We now represent each investment
strategy in terms of elementary investment strategies λk ∈ RK+ , where
(λk)k′ =

 0 k
′ = k
1 k′ = k
.
Hence λk is the relative investment in the asset k ∈ K. Each K-subset of elementary investment strategies
clearly constitutes a basis for the space of investment strategies. Thus each investment strategy λi ∈ ∆K+1+
can be written as a linear superposition of these elementary investment strategies
λi =
K∑
k=0
λikλk, λ
i
k ∈ [0, 1],
K∑
k=0
λik = 1
— Please insert Figure 1 about here —
Two Fund Separation concerns the partition of an optimal fund into two regimes. Here we consider
separation of an equilibrium fund over periods, i.e. the partitioning of wealth distribution w into 0 period
consumption and 1 period portfolio selection on the security market A. We therefore call this separation
Two-Period Fund Separation (2pFS).
Deﬁnition 2 (Two-period-Fund Separation (2pFS)) Let λi(wi) ∈ ∆K+1+ be the investment strategy
of agent i on the market A in a CNE economy given his wealth wi ∈ R+. Then 2pFS holds if and only if
for all investment strategies λi ∈ ∆K+1+ , there exists a unique common portfolio investment λ¯ ∈ ∆K+1+ for
all investors i on the security market A such that
λi(wi) ∈
〈
λ0, λ¯
〉
∩ ∆K+1+ (17)
for an equilibrium strategy for all investors i ∈ I.
Since dim
〈
λ0, λ¯
〉
= 1, this is equivalent to saying that each investment strategy is uniquely represented
by a real number λi0(w
i) ∈ [0, 1]:
λi(wi) := λi0(w
i)λ0 + (1− λi0(wi))λ¯,
where λi0(w
i) is the relative investment of investor i in 0 period consumption and λ¯ is the unique mutual
fund on A. This situation is displayed in Figure 1. In other words, under 2pFS optimal investment
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strategies only diﬀer in relative investments in 0 period consumption. Investment strategies then have the
following representation with respect to the coordinate system (λ0, λ¯):
λi(wi) =
(
λi0(w
i), (1− λi0(wi))
)
(18)
Standard two fund separation (Cass and Stiglitz [5]) refers to separation of investment decisions in a risk-
less asset and a fund of risky asset components. In our model zero period consumption plays a similar role
as the riskless asset in standard two fund separation since it also guarantees risk free payoﬀs - however
delivered one period before the other assets pay oﬀ. If in our model some of the assets k ∈ K were risk free
then, due to borrowing and saving, the diﬀerent time periods of the riskless payoﬀs would not matter. Yet
our model uses a slightly stronger structure than only separating between riskless and risky payoﬀs. In our
model additive separability over time and the INADA conditions imply that one has to consume something
in period 0, i.e. riskfree consumption is essential and cannot be substituted by possibly risky consumption.
The main question is which properties on the market structure A and on the utility functions Ui per-
mit 2pFS. Our ﬁrst statement concerns the market, the second the utility functions. We ﬁrst show in
Theorem 2 that 2period fund separation holds for any economy provided there is no aggregate risk. Ever
since Borch and Malinvaud [2, 13] this case has been intensively studied in the literature. Furthermore, as
Theorem 3 shows, 2pFS also holds if utility functions are CRRA. Cass and Stiglitz [5] have already found
the importance of CRRA for fund separation. In our model with only one period, CRRA is equivalent to
having a single fund on assets. Let us consider these cases in more detail.
Theorem 2 Consider an economy without aggregate risk, i.e.
∑
k A
k
s = a, a ∈ R+ and non zero endow-
ment, i.e. (wi)i ∈ RI+. Then there exists an equilibrium in which 2pFS holds, the mutual fund being
λ¯k =
∑
s∈S
ps
Aks∑
k′ A
k′
s
=
1
a
∑
s∈S
psA
k
s .
This particular mutual fund preserves a special notation, λ¯ = λ∗.
Proof 3 Obviously
∑
k λ¯k = 1. We show that, provided there is no aggregate risk, there exists an λ
i
0 ∈ [0, 1]
such that λi = λi0λ0 + (1− λi0)λ¯ is an CNE equilibrium. Suppose 2pFS holds. Let λˆ0 :=
(
λˆ10, .., λˆ
I
0,
)
and
deﬁne νi(λˆ0) =
1−λˆi0∑
j(1−λˆj0)wj
, then the Nash terms becomes
N ik(λˆ0) = 1− νi(λˆ0)wi ∀k ∈ K,
while consumption reduces to ci0(λˆ0) = λˆ
i
0w
i and cis(λˆ0) =
(∑
k A
k
s
)
νi(λˆ0)w
i for all s ∈ S. Note that if
λˆi0 → 1, then νi(λˆi0) → 0 and so cis → 0, while if λˆi0 → 0 these quantities remain ﬁnite.
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If there is no aggregate risk, i.e.
∑
k A
k
s = a, the consumption is independent of s, i.e. c
i(λˆ0) =
aνi(λˆ0)w
i 1, where 1 = (1, .., 1) is an S-dimensional vector and ci is constant over all states s. By
deﬁning ci(λˆ0) = aν
i(λˆ0)w
i, we write ci(λˆ0) = c
i(λˆ0)1. Under the NAR assumption with these deﬁnition
the FOC for CNE takes the form
∑
s
∇¯is U i1(ci(λˆ0)1)Aks
(
1− νi(λˆ0)wi
)
= λ¯k
∑
j
(1− λˆj0)wj
Thus we arrive at
∑
j
(1− λˆj0)wj =
(∑
s
Aksps
λ¯k
)
βi ∂
∂ci
ui1(c
i(λˆ0))
∂
∂ci0
ui0(c
i
0(λˆ0)
(
1− νi(λˆ0)wi
)
(19)
= a
βi ∂
∂ci
ui1(c
i(λˆ0))
∂
∂ci0
ui0(c
i
0(λˆ0)
(
1− νi(λˆ0)wi
)
(20)
It remains to be shown that a solution in λˆ0 exists. Therefore note that the left hand side
∑
j(1− λˆj0)wj is
positive and ﬁnite for any λˆ0. If λˆ
i
0 → 0 then 0 < νi(λˆ0) < ∞ and the term βi ∂∂
ci
ui1(c
i(λˆ0)) is positive and
ﬁnite, while ∂
∂
ci0
ui0(ν
i(λˆ0)w
i) →∞ and hence the right hand side tends to 0 as λˆi0 → 0. On the other hand,
if λˆi0 → 1 then νi(λˆ0) → 0 and therefore ci(λˆ0) → 0. While 0 < ∂∂
ci0
ui0(ν
i(λˆ0)) < ∞, ∂∂
ci
ui1(c
i(λˆ0)) → ∞
and hence the right hand side tends to ∞ as λˆi0 → 1. Since both sides are continuous in λˆ0, a solution
exists.
In the mutual fund λ¯ the weight of any asset turns out to be the expected value of its payoﬀ relative to
the total payoﬀ of all assets. This coincides with so called log-optimal pricing (cf. Long [?]). Indeed the
same mutual fund is obtained in the case of logarithmic utility functions - a special case of CRRA which
is covered by our Theorem 3.
— Please insert Figure 2 about here —
Some intuition for this result holding in the case of no aggregate risk is provided by referring to eﬃcient
risk sharing (cf. Borch [2] and Malinvaud [13]) as displayed in Figure 2. Since all agents have expected
utility functions and beliefs are homogenous, in the case of no aggregate risk eﬃcient risk sharing is ob-
tained at ”fair” asset prices, i.e. at prices that are equal the expected payoﬀs of the assets. In this case
every consumer receives a fraction of the aggregate payoﬀs and hence no individual needs to carry any risk.
As Borch and Malinvaud have shown this is clearly a competitive equilibrium.
When agents take their market impact into account they realize that their budget sets are not given
by a budget line but by a curve that lies below the budget line and coincides with it only at the point of
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eﬃcient risk sharing. This is because any demand diﬀerent to the eﬃcient level would turn prices to the
disadvantage1 of the agent deviating from the eﬃcient allocation. This intuition can be derived from a
reinterpretation of the ﬁrst-order-condition
qk/N ik(λ) =
∑
s
Aks ∇¯is U i1
(
ci1(λ
i)
)
k ∈ K, i ∈ I.
Writing the ﬁrst-order-condition this way, on changing the asset allocation λ1 on A taking ratios of any
two components of the vector on the right hand side gives the changes in the marginal rates of substitution
between any two assets while the corresponding ratios on the left-hand-side gives the perceived changes of
relative asset prices. Now suppose a competitive equilibrium is obtained in which this ﬁrst-order-condition
holds ignoring the K Nash-terms. Then choosing the same portfolio as in the competitive equilibrium is
also budget feasible in the situation with strategic interaction. Moreover, as prices are turned to your dis-
advantage, the perceived budget set in the case of strategic interaction is included in the budget set keeping
prices as given. The ﬁrst-order-condition shows that, moreover, the slope of the budget set anticipating
your market impact coincides with that of the competitive budget set at those points where all agents choose
the same portfolio. This is because at these points all K Nash terms identical. Hence, also in the case of
strategic behavior, independently of the risk aversion, the market outcome will be given by complete risk
sharing.
— Please insert Figure 3 about here —
CAPM and NoAggregateRisk We illustrate this theorem by considering an economy without ag-
gregate risk and two equally probable states s = 1, 2 in which two investors i = 1, 2 with identical wealth
w1 = w2, compete for two assets k = 1, 2. Investors can act competitively or strategically. Asset 1 has
payoﬀ (1, α), while asset 2 has payoﬀ (0, 1− α) over states 1, 2. The market structure is given by
A =

 1 α
0 1− α

 , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Note that this market has no aggregate risk, i.e.
∑
k A
k
s = 1 independent of s. The utility function
ui := R+ → R considered is of the form ui(c) = c− γ2 c2. This function is identical across periods and also
among consumers. Note that this function does not satisfy the INADA assumptions made above. Hence
this ”illustration” is not really covered by our previous theorems. Nevertheless, we see from Figure 4 that
all implications of our theorems also hold for this important case.
— Please insert Figure 4 about here —
1Recall that agents are not endowed with assets so that changing prices does not change their income.
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In order to study the case of AGGREGATE RISK consider the market A given as
A =

 2 α
0 1− α

 , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,
while all other speciﬁcations are the same as in the example above, see Figure 4. One observation in his
case is that consumers with identical characteristics [Ui, wi] choose the same portfolio if market behavior
among consumers is homogenous. Both for the economy in which both agents behave competitively and
also for the case of strategic behavior the same portfolio is chosen. On the other hand if we consider an
economy with identical consumer characteristics but with diﬀerent market behavior, then in the presence
of aggregate risk the portfolios diﬀer.
The intuition for this observation is the following: The Nash equilibrium we have computed is a symmet-
ric Nash equilibrium, i.e. a situation in which identical agents choose identical strategies. This symmetry is
also true in the competitive equilibria. Moreover, the available total payoﬀs are independent of the market
behavior we consider. Hence, since there are no redundant assets, with identical consumers‘ characteristics
the portfolio choices in symmetric Nash equilibria coincide with those in the competitive equilibrium. But
still competitive and Nash equilibria diﬀer with respect to the money invested in the mutual fund. On the
other hand, if we mix competitive with strategic behavior in one market, then the strategically acting agent
will invest less in the assets and will consume more today so that he evaluates his portfolio of assets at a
diﬀerent second period wealth level. Hence, if relative risk aversion depends on the wealth level, as it does
in the case of quadratic utilities, then both agents will choose diﬀerent portfolios even though they have
identical characteristics [Ui, wi].
— Please insert Figure 5 about here —
This suggests that if on the other hand the portfolio choice is independent from the wealth level, as it
is in the case of constant relative risk aversion, then all investors should hold the same mutual fund. The
next theorem states that even with aggregate risk 2pFS holds, if all investors have identical relative risk
aversion.
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Theorem 3 Suppose there are no redundant assets, i.e. rank A = K. Moreover, assume all investors
have identical second period relative risk aversion, i.e. ui1 = u1 for all i ∈ I, where u1 : R+ → R is deﬁned
by
u1(c) =

 c
η, 0 < η < 1
ln(c)
c > 0
Then in every CNE (qˆ, λˆ) 2pFS holds, i.e. there exists a common mutual fund λ¯ ∈ ∆K+1+ with
∑K
k=0 λ¯k = 1
such that
λˆ
i ∈
〈
λ0, λ¯
〉
∩∆K+1+ ∀i ∈ I.
The mutual is of the form
λ¯k = 1/µ
∑
s
ps
Aks(∑
k A
k
s
)1−η , (21)
where µ > 0 is a normalization constant so that
∑K
k=1 λ¯k = 1.
Proof 4 Part I: Recall that λ =
(
λi
)
i∈I is the vector of investment strategies on the market. Consider
two investors i, j ∈ I with identical utility functions Ui,Uj : RS+1+ → R. Note that ∇¯iU i1(ci1) is ho-
mogenous of degree ν ∈ {−1, η − 1} for all i ∈ I. Both ’see’ the same price system q. Hence, since
rank A = K, the associated linear map is injective and so the pre-image of q is unique. It thus follows
that ∇¯iU i1(ci1(λi)) • N i(λ) = ∇¯jU j1(cj1(λj)) • N j(λ) and therefore ∇¯iU i1(ci1(λi))‖∇¯jU j1(cj1(λj)). Since
∇¯iU i1(ci1(λi)) and ∇¯jU j1(cj(λj)) are homogenous of the same degree ν and ci1, cj1 are homogenous of de-
gree 1 in λi,λj, it follows that λi‖λj for any pair i, j. Hence all investment strategies {λi} are co-linear
and are in the same subspace, i.e. for every pair (i, j) there exists a real valued scalar 0 ≤ (i, j) ≤ 1 such
that cj = l(i, j)ci. Particularly if λˆi is an CNE investment strategy, then there exists some factor  > 0
such that λ¯ := λˆi and
∑
k λ¯k = 1 is the unique mutual fund which spans the corresponding sum space
〈λ0, λ¯〉.
Part II: Recall that under 2pFS, with the notations from the proof of Theorem 2, the FOC reads
∑
s
Aks ∇¯is U i1
(
ci1(λˆ0)
) (
1− νi(λˆ0)wi
)
= λ¯k
∑
j
(1− λˆj0)wj ,
where cis(λˆ0) =
(∑
k A
k
s
)
νi(λ0)w
i is the consumption in state s. Assume that λˆi0 > 0 and deﬁne K(λˆ
i
0) :=
βi
(
∂
∂ci0
ui0(c
i
0)
)−1
. Note that K(λˆi0) → 0 as λˆi0 → 0, while it is positive and ﬁnite for λi0 > 0. Then the
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FOC equivalently reads
∑
s
Aks ∇¯is U i1
(
ci(λˆ0)
) (
1− νi(λˆ0)wi
)
= λ¯k
(1− λˆi0)wi
νi(λˆi0)w
i
(22)
ηK(λˆi0)
(∑
s
psA
k
s
(∑
k
Aks
)η−1) (
1− νi(λˆ0)wi
)
(νi(λˆ0)w
i)η−1 = λ¯k
(1− λˆi0)wi
νi(λˆi0)w
i
(23)
ηK(λˆi0)
(∑
s
ps
Aks(∑
k A
k
s
)1−η
) (
1− νi(λˆ0)wi
)
(νi(λˆ0)w
i)η = λ¯k(1− λˆi0)wi, (24)
Inserting (24), we obtain
η/µK(λˆi0)
(
1− νi(λˆ0)wi
)
(νi(λˆ0)w
i)η = (1− λˆi0)wi (25)
η/µ
(
1− νi(λˆ0)wi
)
(νi(λˆ0)w
i)η = (1− λˆi0)wi βi
(
∂
∂ci0
ui0(c
i
0)
)
(26)
The right-hand-side is strictly increasing in λi0 and tends to 0 if λ
i
0 → 1, while it tends to +∞ if λi0 → 0.
To discuss the behavior of the right-hand-side, recall that νi(λi0) → 0 if λi0 → 1, while it remains positive
and ﬁnite for λi0 < 1. Put x := ν
i(λi0)w
i, then x ∈ R+. The real valued function f(x) = (1 − x)xη,
0 < η < 1 is concave, d
dx
f(x)|x=0 = +∞, and has two roots (0, 1). Hence there exist two solutions of
equation (26), a trivial one λˆi0 = 1 and a non trivial one 0 < λˆ
i
0 < 1.
Note that the general mutual fund, see equation 21, includes those for the case of NAR, log-utilities,
and also of risk-neutrality: Indeed for η = −1 we get that λ¯k is the expected relative payoﬀ of asset k, while
for η = 0 we get that λ¯k is the relative expected payoﬀ of asset k.
Log utility function on a market with aggregate risk For illustration we consider the same
setting as deﬁned above, i.e. a market with aggregate risk but now consider the case that both investors have
identical CRRA utility functions, particularly logarithmic ones, i.e. ui1(c) = ln(c). The extended market
structure thus is
A =

 2 α
0 1− α

 , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
For simplicity we assume that states 1 and 2 are equally probable, i.e. p1 = p2 = 1/2, and wealth distribu-
tion is w1 = w2.
— Please insert Figure 6 about here —
Theorem 3 states an interesting property of CNE. However it does not establish the existence of CNE
with these properties. The next proposition shows that such an investment strategy in fact establishes a
CNE.
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Proposition 1 Let λi ∈ 〈λ0, λ¯〉. Then there exists a real valued coeﬃcient 0 ≤ λi0 ≤ 1 such that
λi = λi0λ0 + (1− λi0)λ¯
is a CNE investment strategy for investor i.
Proof 5 Using notations as in the proof of Theorem 2 and by deﬁning functions F and Gk by F(λ0) :=
A∇¯iU i1((
∑
k A
k
s )ν
i(λ0)w
i) and Gk(λ0) := λ¯k
∑
j(1− λj0)wj, the FOC reads
Fk(λ0)(1− νi(λ0)wi) = Gk(λ0).
Note that 0 < Gk(λ0) < ∞ for any given λ0 while if λi0 → 0, then Fk(λ0) → 0 and if λi0 → 1 then
Fk(λ0) →∞. Since both functions are continuous in λ0, a solution exists.
The next theorem shows that under 2pFS agents acting strategically invest less in the mutual fund than
those acting competitively. As a consequence of this the utility level of the agents in a market in which
every agent behaves strategically is higher than the utility level in a competitive market. Note that this
statement does not conﬂict with the ﬁrst welfare theorem, i.e. with the claim that competitive equilibria
are Pareto-eﬃcient. In our model from a central planning perspective the agents are strictly better oﬀ
consuming almost all their wealth today and betting only very little on the asset market. This is because
the assets are in ﬁxed supply while the ﬁrst period consumption good is in inﬁnitely elastic supply.
Theorem 4 Let λ∗i(wi) = λi∗0 (w
i)λ0 +(1−λ∗0(wi))λ¯ be a CE. Then λ˜i(wi) = λ˜i0(wi)λ0 +
(
1− λ˜i0(wi)
)
λ
is a NE for some λ˜i0(w
i) ≥ λi∗0 (wi).
Proof 6 Consider an economy with given wealth distribution w = (wi, i = 1, ..., I) and assume that λ(wi) ∈〈
λ0, λ¯
〉
is a CE. We show that there exists λ˜i0 such that λ˜(w
i) = λ˜i0λ0 + (1− λ˜i0)λ¯ is a NE. For the sake
of simplicity let λ0 = (λ
i
0) :=
(
λi0(w
i), i ∈ I) be the vector of 0 period investments of agents i. Then deﬁne
the following function F i(λ0) := A∇¯iU i1(ci1(λ0))− q∗. In fact ∂∂λi0F
i
k(λ0) > 0 since c
i
s(λ0) → 0 if λi0 → 1
and hence ∇¯isui1(cis) → +∞ according to the INADA assumption on ui1. The FOCs for CE then takes the
form
F ik(λ0) = 0.
Let λ∗0 such that for given w = (w
i), F ik(λ∗0) = 0 for all k. Finally deﬁne Gi(λ0) := A∇¯iU i1(ci1)•N i(λ0)−
q(λ0). Let λ
#
0 be such that q(λ
#
0 ) = q
∗. Then since N ik(λ#0 ) ≤ 1, we have Gik(λ#0 ) ≤ F ik(λ#0 ). Hence it
follows that λ˜0 implicitly deﬁned by Gi(λ˜0) = 0 fulﬁlls
λ˜0 ≥ λ∗0,
or equivalently λ˜0(w
i) ≥ λ∗0(wi).
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Hence under two-period fund separation, thinking strategically, i.e. taking into account that prices ”slip
away” on increasing orders, does matter for the share of wealth invested in the mutual fund, however it
does not aﬀect the portfolio allocation within the group of assets.
6 Asset pricing implications
¿From Corollary 1 above it is clear that CE and NE prices are the same in the limit of inﬁnitely large
markets with homogenous investor’s population, i.e. for I → ∞. What about prices on markets in which
investors act strategically and others do not. The question is whether thinking strategically matters for
asset prices on small markets. The next statement shows that relative asset prices are independent of the
composition of market participants as long as two-period Fund Separation holds. Particularly if 2pFS holds,
then relative asset prices in a pure competitive and a pure Nash investor population are identical to those
in combined Competitive Nash economies.
Corollary 4 If 2pFS holds, relative prices are independent of the composition of the agent’s population.
Proof 7 According to the market clearing condition, under 2pFS prices fulﬁll qˆk =
∑
i∈I λˆ
i
kw
i for all
k ∈ K. By Theorem 2 we have 2pFS in the CNE economy with the unique mutual fund λ¯. Hence we have
for the prices of assets k ∈ K
qˆk = λ¯k
∑
i
(1− λi0)wi
such that qˆk
qˆj
is in fact independent of the partitioning of I.
Recall the two examples mentioned above. We in fact observe that for our respective conditions relative
prices are identical in the diﬀerent regimes. By (C/C) we denote a regime in which both investors have
competitive behavior, in a (N/N) regime both investors behave strategically while in the (C/N) regime
investor 1 acts competitively while investor 2 behaves strategically. The following table gives the relatives
prices on a market with aggregate risk and a market without, when both investors have CAPM preferences
and follow diﬀerent strategies. As above the market is
A =

 2 α
0 1− α

 , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Note that, as mentioned above, the identity of prices in homogenous (C / C) and (N / N) economies is a
result of the symmetry of the setting!
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α CAPM - NAR CAPM - AR
(C/C) (N/N) (C/N) (C/C) (N/N) (C/N)
0 1 1 1 1.33.. 1.33.. 1.226
.1 1.22.. 1.22.. 1.22.. 1.593 1.593 1.462
.2 1.55.. 1.55.. 1.55.. 1.917 1.917 1.755
.3 1.857 1.857 1.857 2.33.. 2.33.. 2.1324
.4 2.33.. 2.33 2.33 2.889 2.889 2.634
.5 2.99.. 2.99 2.99 3.667 3.667 3.334
.6 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.833.. 4.833 4.383
.7 5.66.. 5.66 5.66 6.778 6.778 6.128
.8 9.000 9.000 9.000 10.667 10.667 9.612
.9 19.0 19.0 19.0 22.33.. 22.33.. 20.053
6.1 Derivatives
One ﬁeld in ﬁnance which has taken market impact as a serious concern is the ﬁeld of derivatives in which
slippage and liquidity holes have been taken into account when hedging a contingent claim.
A nice intuitive account of these eﬀects for managing derivatives is given in Taleb [19], chapter 4.
For a more rigorous analysis along these lines see Frey and Stremme [7] and Scho¨nbucher and Willmot
[18] who have adjusted the famous Black and Scholes formula for slippage of prices. This literature also
recognizes that slippage has some upside: ”Many large traders use their buying power to prop up the market
in which they accumulate positions” Taleb [19], page 69. To the best of our knowledge, the pros and cons
of the market impact have not been balanced systematically by this literature. Moreover, it is questionable
to consider one sided strategic interaction in which only one party is allowed to act strategically while the
rest of the market is passive.
Introducing derivatives leads to a new strategic aspect of the model considered here. On changing de-
mand for the underlying asset agents can change the payoﬀs of the derivative assets that are based on
the prices of that underlying. Indeed in this case it turns out that even with logarithmic utility functions
equilibria depend substantially on the form of market behavior!
We illustrate this aspect by the following simple model of a look-back option. The payoﬀ matrix is given
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as
A =

 1 0
α q1

 ,
where q1 is the price of asset 1 determined in the ﬁrst period. I.e. the second asset pays the price of
the ﬁrst asset if state 2 occurs. Again states s1 and s2 are equally probable, both investors are identical,
i.e. have the same endowment w1 = w2 and have the same logarithmic utility functions. Investors can act
competitively or strategically. Hence there are three situation: Both act competitively, both act strategically,
one investor acts competitively while the other investor acts strategically. The simulation, Figure 7 shows
that the funds chosen by the investors diﬀer signiﬁcantly if both follow diﬀerent strategies.
— Please insert Figure 7 about here —
7 Conclusions and Outlook
We have suggested a simple asset market model in which we analyzed competitive and strategic behavior
simultaneously. We have shown that if for competitive behavior two-fund separation holds across periods
then it also holds for strategic behavior. In this case the relative prices of the assets do not depend on
whether agents behave strategically or competitively. Those agents acting strategically will however invest
less in the common mutual fund. Constant relative risk aversion and absence of aggregate risk have been
shown to be two alternative suﬃcient conditions for two-period fund separation. With derivatives further
strategic aspects arise and strategic behavior is distinct from competitive behavior even for those utility
functions leading to two-fund separation.
These results are ﬁrst steps in building a new capital asset market model in which strategic interaction
plays some role. Further research may endogeneize wealth by giving agents endowments in terms of assets.
Moreover, the model should be extended to multiple periods.
References
[1] Alos-Ferrer, Carlos and Ana Ania (2003): ”The Stock Market Game and the Kelly Nash Equilib-
rium”; Department of Economics Discussion Paper, University of Vienna, forthcoming in Journal of
Mathematical Economics.
[2] Borch, Karl(1962): ”Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Market”; Econometrica; Volume 30: 424 – 444.
[3] Brunnermeier, Markus-K (2001): ”Asset pricing under asymmetric information: Bubbles, crashes,
technical analysis, and herding”; Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
22
[4] Campbell, John and Luis Viceira (2002): ”Strategic Asset Allocation”, Oxford University Press.
[5] Cass, David and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1970): ”The Structure of Investor Preferences and Asset Returns,
and Separability in Portfolio Allocation: A Contribution to the Pure Theory of Mutual Funds”, Journal
of Economic Theory 2: 122-160.
[6] Debreu, Gerard and Herbert Scarf (1962): ”A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy”; Interna-
tional Economic Review 4: 235 –246.
[7] Frey,-Ru¨diger and Stremme,-Alexander (1997): ”Market Volatility and Feedback Eﬀects from Dynamic
Hedging”; Mathematical Finance. October 1997; 7(4): 351-74.
[8] Gabszewicz, Jean-Jacque and Jean-Paul Vial (1972): ”Oligopoly a` la Cournout in general equilibrium
analysis”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol 4: 381-400.
[9] Hildenbrand, Werner and Alan Kirman (1988): ”Equilibrium Analysis”, North Holland: Amsterdam.
[10] Kraus, Alan and Robert H. Litzenberger (1975): ”Market Equilibrium in a Multiperiod State Prefer-
ence Model with Logarithmic Utility”; The Journal of Finance, Vol. 30, pp. 1213 – 1227.
[11] Luenberger, David G. (1997): ”Investment Science”, Oxford University Press.
[12] Magill, Michael and Martine Quinzii: ”Theory of Incomplete Markets”,1995, MIT Press.
[13] Malinvaud, Edmond: ”The Allocation of Individual Risk in Large Markets”, Journal of Economic
Theory, 1972, Vol. 4, pp 312–328.
[14] Mas-Colell, Andreu (1982): ”The Cournotian foundations of Walrasian equilibrium theory: en exposi-
tion of recent theory”, chapter 7 in Advances in econometrics; ed. by Werner Hildenbrand, Cambridge
University Press,Cambridge.
[15] Merton, Robert C. (1971): ”Optimum Consumption and Portfolio Rules in a Continuous-Time
Model”, Journal of Economic Theory 3: 373–413.
[16] Pagano, Marco (1998): ”Trading Volume and Asset Liquidity”, Quarterly Journal of Economics
104(2), 255-274.
[17] Shapley, Lloyd and Martin Shubik (1977): ”Trade Using one Commodity as a Means of Payment”;
Journal of Political Economy 85: 937-968.
[18] Scho¨nbucher, Philipp and Paul Willmot (2000): ”The Feedback Eﬀect of Hedging in Illiquid Markets”
SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics , Vol. 61 (1), 232–272:
[19] Taleb, Nassim (1996): ”Dynamic Hedging: Managing Vanilla and Exotic Options”, John Wiley and
Sons, New York.
23























λ¯
λ1
λ2λ0
•
•
λi(wi)
Figure 1: The simplex ∆3+ of investment strategies λ = (λ0,λ1) over periods 0 and 1 on a market
A ∈ R2×2+ displayed in R2+.
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Figure 2: Complete Risk Sharing in Competitive and in Nash Equilibrium
Figure 3: Mutual funds for log utility functions on a market with aggregate risk depending on the
market parameter α as deﬁned in the examples.
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Figure 4: Funds chosen by the two CAPM investors on a market WITHOUT aggregate risk.
Funds of investors coincide if both have the same market behavior (dots). The solid line shows the
common mutual fund chosen by BOTH investors even if they act according to diﬀerent strategies,
particularly investor 1 acts competitively and investor 2 acts strategically. This ﬁgure should be
compared with the analogous setting for a market WITH aggregate risk
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Figure 5: Funds chosen by the two CAPM investors on the market WITH AGGRGATE RISK.
Due to the symmetry of the situation funds of investors coincide if both have the same market
behavior (dots), while they choose diﬀerent funds on the asset market, displayed by lines (dashed
for the competitive investor and dotted for the Nash investor), if they follow diﬀerent strategies,
i.e. one of them is acting strategically while the other behaviors competitively.
27
Figure 6: Fund selection of investors with log utility functions on a market with aggregate risk. Dots
represent mutual funds chosen if both investor follow the same strategy, while the line indicates
mutual funds chosen if one acts strategically while the other competitively. Even if both investors
follow diﬀerent strategies they choose the same fund on the asset market.
Figure 7: Selection of funds in a small economy with derivatives. Because of symmetry both
investors act identically in a C/C economy or in a N/N economy, while in a C/N economy both
investors clearly behave diﬀerently.
28
